Diplomacy Lessons

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Advice for an unloved superpower

Former American diplomat and current Athens resident John Brady Kiesling looks at how US foreign policy went astray ATHENS NEWS review, 25/08/2006

THEODORE COULOUMBIS*

MY TEACHING career began at the American University in Washington DC back in 1965. It was a time of creeping escalation of conflict in Vietnam. The US, without allies, was in the process of becoming enmeshed into a protracted and asymmetric war on the mainland of Asia.

On one side there was America's mobile power, its advanced military technology, and a mission - perhaps misapplied in the case of Vietnam - of containing Soviet might and World Communism. On the other side was a poor, primitively armed but determined foe, mesmerised by an amalgam of anti-colonialist, Marxist and nationalist slogans. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had, however, two vital allies: the jungle and an excessive capacity to absorb pain and destruction.

In conversations with colleagues and students I used to argue for what today one would call a multilateralist approach to US foreign policy. It involved a mixture of power, patience and prudence, the maintenance of self-regulating regional balances and the employment of international institutions to preserve a world order in which the United States stood at the pinnacle.

Upon hearing my sermon, a dear friend and colleague, somewhere between amusement and exasperation, quipped: "Teddy, nice and good...but you are writing a recipe for Canada or a Scandinavian country, not for the free world's powerful leader".

In some respects John Brady Kiesling's excellent new book, Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower, is a passionate plea for the exercise of what Joseph Nye in his 2004 book labelled "soft power". The Kiesling volume, in my view, is a must read for young men and women aspiring to enter the American Foreign Service. It will also enlighten and challenge the thinking of active-duty diplomats, intelligence and military officers, members of Congress, journalists, lobbyists, and business people in America and abroad.

At the personal level - in a masterfully written first chapter - Kiesling outlines the deep internal struggle of conscience that led him to resign from the American foreign service, where he then served as political officer in the US embassy in Greece, at the peak of his career. He strongly dissented with the Bush administration's uncritical insistence on becoming entangled in yet another Asian mainland war in politically uncharted Iraq.

Kiesling emerges from his narrative as a patriot in the full sense of the word. He is proud of his country, its values and its role in the past few centuries. But, ultimately, he believes that the motto which best suits the United States is "my country right, not wrong".

There is a basic thread that runs through the fifteen chapters of this highly engaging study: The author's central thesis is that the foreign service can be divided roughly in two categories: "Diplomats" and "Bureaucrats".

The former, perhaps the majority of foreign service officers, are moved by curiosity, are willing to learn by listening to varying voices in the host country, are sceptical about "reality", and are eager to report and recommend without trying to anticipate what the authorities back home want to hear. In short, they are unwilling to "go along" with Washington's conventional wisdom, merely to "get along" in their careers by not making waves.

On the other side of the fence, the Bureaucrats, are an activist and outspoken minority that more easily rises to the rank of ambassador, turn their curiosity inward so as to map the bureaucratic and personality turf wars within the Washington beltway. They care less about the uncertainties and nuances of countries abroad, especially small, developing ones, and they focus more on the views and potential pitfalls of putative competitors within the foreign service.

Ultimately, for them, pleasing the occasional "prince" that occupies the White House is vital, and they fail to correctly identify the many traps that lie ahead when simplistic slogans about "good" and "evil" lead to disastrous campaigns such as in Korea (1950-54), Vietnam (1965-75) and Iraq (2003-?).

Chapters 2 through 14 of this thought-provoking volume present an excellent list of "dos and don'ts" for future formulators of American foreign policy. Kiesling is neither a dreamer nor a do-gooder. He believes in what he calls "prudent and value-based realism".

In a genuine Machiavellian spirit, he argues that it is not enough for the world's only superpower to be feared. America should also be loved. And this gives the author a chance - every step of the way - to consider war and the use of force as the option of last resort, while focusing on public diplomacy and pro-active means of persuasion in countries that are deemed vital for US interests.

Valid examples are richly plucked from Kiesling's professional service in countries such as Greece (where he spent a good number of years), Armenia, Israel, Morocco, as well as countries he watched from headquarters in Washington, such as India and Romania.

There is a clear political message throughout. The Bush administration scores very badly indeed in Kiesling's grade book. As he notes, "Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed memorably in the 2005 US National Defence Strategy that using 'international fora' and 'judicial processes' is like terrorism itself, 'a strategy of the weak'."

Consistently, the author challenges what he considers the solipsistic, Rumsfeldian view. Some of his best insights focus on terrorism and the ill-conceived neoconservative response to it after the tragedy of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001.

Kiesling's advice to policymakers is crystal-clear:

1) Do not indulge in pre-emptive wars based on faulty intelligence provided by ill-informed or miss-informing and clearly self-serving exiles (eg Ahmed Chalabi).

2) Contrast intelligence insights picked up by a variety of services such as the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency and Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as regular reports from embassies abroad.

3) Do not favour intelligence that tends to support preconceived notions or hastily made decisions.

4) Encourage foreign service and other country team members to be comfortable with the host country's language, given that 95 percent of accurate intelligence can be derived from open, unclassified sources.

5) Emphasise foreign aid and public information programmes and de-emphasise clandestine activities and covert action that, when exposed, badly boomerang.

6) Based on careful evaluation, prepare, well in advance, for an adequate and face-saving exit strategy, should things - as in Iraq or Vietnam - go awry.

7) Remember, you are heading a privileged, status quo power. And should a rapid and forced democratisation campaign - especially in the Middle East - lead to chaos, better apply the Turkish proverb "... may the snake that does not bite me live a thousand years".

8) Ultimately - as politicians - trust your professionals and try to place America's national interests over partisan (re-election) or personal (re-election) interests.

I am not sure whether - in this short essay - I have done justice to a fine, truthful and complex book about the dilemmas of international politics. I am convinced, however, that Kiesling - a young fifty-year-old - will have much to offer in the days and years to come in efforts to reorient American policy so as to restore this great country's reputation back to the days of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

The best way to conclude this introduction is to quote from Kiesling's February 24, 2003 resignation letter, addressed to the former US secretary of state, Colin Powell: "Mr Secretary, I have enormous respect for your character and ability... But your loyalty to the president goes too far. We are straining beyond its limits an international system we built with such toil and treasure, a web of laws, treaties, organisations and shared values that sets limits on our foes far more effectively than it ever constrained America's ability to defend its interests."

One should contrast this plea with Richard Haass' response to Kiesling on behalf of the secretary: "Our actions on Iraq are fully compatible both with American values and American interests. They reflect our goal of protecting the American people and the international community from the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction held (sic) by the Iraqi regime."

* The reviewer is professor emeritus at the University of Athens and director of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

ATHENS NEWS , 25/08/2006, page: A12 Article code: C13197A121

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